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CHAPTER I.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE-
THE PAST AND FUTURE OF U.S. RELATIONS
WITH CHINA AND THE USSR
Donald W. Treadgold*
Let us begin with a Yugoslavian story. It seems that Carter and
Brezhnev fall into a heated ideological disagreement at their Vienna summit,
and both have heart attacks which apparently render them moribund. Teams
of doctors, however, are put to work reviving them, and they eventually
succeed - but only after a hundred years have passed. They reawaken
simultaneously, and the first thing they hear is a radio news broadcast. The
first item begins, "The President of the United States and the First Secretary
of the U.S. Communist Party . . . ." Brezhnev shouts, "See, I told you so!"
The second item begins: "Serious disturbances are reported on the Chinese-
Finnish border." Carter shouts, "See, I told you so!" The third item begins:
"President Tito, on his 187th birthday, has received a Yugoslav youth
delegation." (Remember, it is a Yugoslavian story.) That anecdote does not
really relate what the future will be like, for Tito will not live to be 187 years
old.
Since particular legal, diplomatic and commercial problems will be
explored by later speakers, this paper will attempt to analyze some of the
broad underlying motives and aims of Americans. I use the term "Americans"
generally, because many of the most important U.S. involvements with
Russia and China, especially with China, were not governmental at all. I
shall conclude by offering a few warnings for the future. I give here more
attention to China than to Russia, because the Chinese connection is the new
- or more precisely, the recently - one and therefore, the active ingredient
of the mix.
United States relations with Russia and China began at a time when
Great Britain ruled the seas. Although Britain had just lost the American
colonies, it was about to succeed in building itself a new empire which would
bring it close to domination of the world. This domination was generally
benevolent, disturbing very little the indigenous institutions of the colonized
country. Many aspects of American relations with Russia, China and other
countries in distant continents were determined by the actions and reactions
of the British. Nevertheless, the United States found itself gradually
preparing to assume its dominant role in world affairs during the mid-
twentieth century.
* Chairman of the Department of History, University of Washington; President
of the American Association for Advancement of Slavic Studies.
(1)
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
The first American envoy was sent to Russia as result of a Congressional
resolution passed in 1780. That envoy, Francis Dana, served in a strictly
unofficial capacity; he was a young man who took with him someone younger
still, John Quincy Adams, who was to return in 1809 to become the first U.S.
minister in St. Petersburg. Alexander I and Thomas .Jefferson exchanged a
pleasantly distant correspondence. In those years, the Russians were
obtaining a foothold in Alaska and they established a settlement known as
Fort Ross, short for "Rossiia," near San Francisco. The possibility that the
Russians would annex and colonize the West Coast never materialized. A
trade treaty was signed in 1832, but had little effect; Russia seemed far away,
as did "Russian America," to the still Atlantic-oriented United States. During
the Civil War, Russian squadrons called at northern ports, mainly as a way of
tweaking the nose of the British lion which was showing some sympathy for
the South. These naval visits helped create the atmosphere in which Alaska
was sold to the United States in 1867 for a paltry $7 million which many then
regarded as a grossly excessive sum.
In the nineteenth century, American-Russian relations followed a gener-
ally uneventful course. Many Russian radicals and liberals admired U.S.
society and government or aspects thereof; several Americans sympathized
with Russian opposition to autocracy and deprecated its rigors and repressive
qualities. Such men included Andrew Dickson White, U.S. minister and
future president of Cornell University, and George Kennan, a distant relation
of our contemporary of the same name and author of a book entitled Siberia
and the Exile System which had a sizable impact on American opinion. But
other U.S. diplomats were seldom so gifted and knowledgeable. A striking
example was David Francis, our ambassador in 1917, the year in which the
last tsar was overthrown and the Provisional Government came to nominal
power. Shortly after Lenin returned to Russia, Francis sent Washington a
cable: "Extreme socialist or anarchist named Lenin making violent speeches
and thereby strengthening government; designedly giving him leeway and
will deport opportunely." The deportation, needless to say, was not forth-
coming.
The February Revolution and the coming of democratic government,
though it proved abortive to Russia, did have an important effect on the
circumstances in which the United States entered World War I. Now all the
major European allies against Germany - Britain, France and Russia -
were ostensibly committed to Wilsonian ideas or slogans. But the world was
not made safe for democracy, nor was Russia. The Russian Civil War
followed, accompanied by an Allied intervention in which no U.S. troops
fought and in which American motives were far from unambiguously
anti-Bolshevik. From such agonies emerged the Soviet regime.
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It was not until well after Britain and France had accorded the USSR
formal recognition that the United States followed suit. The United States
was not always well served by its envoys: Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, for
example, thought Stalin's purge trials were justified. During World War II,
many Americans tried to paint their Soviet ally democratic, but after
1944-45 Stalin all but destroyed this picture. The story of the so-called "cold
war" and new beginnings of dtente with Nixon after 1972 need not be retold
here.
To summarize, in the 1920s and 30s, a few Americans believed, or at
least hoped, that the Soviets were building a new earthly paradise; Lincoln
Steffens, for example, reported somewhat prematurely, "I have seen the
future and it works." A larger number hoped, more modestly, that the United
States could cooperate effectively with Stalin against Hitler. In order to
believe that such cooperation was realized, one must overlook the Nazi-Soviet
Pact which enabled Hitler to begin World War II and the ways in which
American aid was concealed by the Soviet government from its own people.
The appearance of genuine American revolutionaries in the 1960s came when
there had been exposure of Stalin's misdeeds by Khrushchev and others to
dim the luster of the USSR for leftists. For many of them, China replaced
Russia as the land of idealist dreams. Nixon, Ford and Kissinger may or may
not have been wise in their dealings with the Soviet Union, but certainly
they were under no romantic illusions about the Soviets. Even the Carter
administration has refused to be deceived although some hold that it has
been inept in its management of Soviet affairs.
United States relations with China followed a quite different course.
China was markedly different from Russia which represented a strange breed
of Europeans, and the few Russians who reached the United States were not
easily identifiable in the American polyglot of the nineteenth century. But
from the time the first Chinese immigrants arrived in California about 1850,
they seemed, at worst, a dirty and incomprehensible lot. At best, they seemed
hard-working yet difficult to understand and easy to spot among masses of
whites. American attitudes always mixed contempt with affection, even love,
for China. For instance, the first university chair in Chinese in this country
was established in 1901 after a retired general hit his Chinese butler over the
head in a fit of rage. Regretting his actions afterward, the general endowed
the Dean Lung (the butler's name) Professorship at Columbia University.
The first Americans touched Chinese soil in 1784 when the ship Empress
of China visited Canton, beginning a long history of trade with China. Such
trade was responsible for the creation of several New England commercial
dynasties. To be sure, there were always some exaggerated expectations, both
before and after the first U.S.-China treaty was concluded by Caleb Cushing
in 1843. Some believed that a salesman could become a John D. Rockefeller
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overnight if every Chinese would buy from America one ounce of wheat or
one shirt per year, or even if every shirt bought by a Chinese was to be
lengthened by one inch (a serious calculation of a half century ago). Such
expectations were never realized and will not be in the foreseeable future.
But realistic businessmen found buying and selling on a modest scale
profitable.
Influential Americans aimed at three successive but overlapping forms of
change for China - envisaging Christianization, the introduction of democ-
racy and the establishment of socialism. The first U.S. missionaries to arrive
in China were Elijah Bridgman and David Abeel in 1830. As were most
American missionaries throughout the nineteenth century, they were Protes-
tants of the fundamentalist variety. Most of them were ill-equipped for the
task of conversion, knew little of China or the Chinese language, and hated
Chinese culture. One described the street chapel through which most
missionaries tried to work as "the missionary's fort, where he throws hot shot
and shell into the enemy's camp. . . ." Another wrote that "the invention of
the Chinese language has been ascribed to the devil, who endeavored by it to
prevent [the triumph of Christianity]." (This is a view which Western
students of the language to this day may find seductive, but it is one they try
to resist.) During the forty years ending in 1914, it was reported that 17
million Chinese Bibles or Testaments had been distributed. The literate
Chinese, into whose hands these religious materials fell, found they could
neither understand them, since pietist dogma excluded any notes or
comment, nor sell them. The result was that such items were worthless. Here
we can only mention in passing the Taiping Rebellion. The rebels were
composed of a Christian sect owing their professed ideology almost entirely to
Anglo-Saxon missionaries. The leaders were, however, too crude (like most of
the missionaries of the time) and maladroit to conciliate the Western powers
and the Chinese scholar-gentry, whose neutrality, at the very least, was
needed in order to sustain the rebellion.
Just before 1900, the fundamentalist Protestants were replaced by
modernists in both the United States and China. In their hands, Christian
conversion and the introduction of democracy came to be equated with each
other. Sun Yat-sen, the first president of the Chinese Republic, was a
Christian modernist. Beginning with William Howard Taft and Woodrow
Wilson, American presidents called for the conversion of China to Christian-
ity and the export of American-style democratic institutions to the former
Celestial Empire. Shortly thereafter, however, there appeared Americans
who were ardent democrats but who were not Christians. Notable among
them was John Dewey, whose Chinese disciple Hu Shih wanted a China
modeled after the United States but who was also sensible enough to realize
that the transformation could not come overnight. On the American side,
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these expectations helped set the stage for the image of China projected in
Pearl Buck's novel The Good Earth and the 1937 film based on it. The hopes
of Americans rather than the cold Chinese reality were conveyed to the 23
million Americans who saw the film (not to mention nearly 50 million others
outside China).
In the 1920s came the return of the American missionaries' beloved Sun
Yat-sen, and after his death, Chiang Kai-shek, emerged as leader of the
Kuomintang. It seemed that a democratic China was at hand; at any rate, the
Kuomintang leaders had to promise democracy in order to be given a place
among the peacemakers of World War II. The possibility that such a promise
was not in the power of any Chinese to make, given China's institutional
heritage at that point, never seemed to concern Americans.
By this time, the U.S. government had given up hopes for Christianiza-
tion but was still exploring the possibility of democratization. Other
Americans were, however, sensing that something had gone wrong. In the
1930s and 40s, a new anthropological relativism suggested that each culture
had gone, and ought to go, its own way; America should not prescribe
formulas for others. As for the Chinese intellectuals who would either plan
their country's destiny or rationalize its realities, many of them had rejected
Christianity and were abandoning liberal and democratic ideas for Marxism-
Leninism. That doctrine, or variants thereof, became popular in many
Chinese intellectual circles outside of the area where the Chinese Commu-
nists, almost smashed by Chiang, had found refuge around Yenan. Some
Americans, such as General Stilwell, tried during World War II to browbeat
the Chinese into doing things "the American way," but experienced only
frustration and disillusionment. By now Edgar Snow, a few missionaries and
a number of secular writers began to tell the American public about the new
tidy, orderly and efficient China being built by Communists who were
basically only agrarian reformers.
Wilson had urged democracy as the guiding principle of the future.
Franklin D. Roosevelt announced the four freedoms, the truly operative ones
being anti-imperialism, decolonization and national independence. Lyndon B.
Johnson selected free elections to emphasize. The Carter administration had
deemphasized free elections (except for Rhodesia), and instead has chosen to
stress another part of the democratic vision - "human rights." These rights
are expected to be enjoyed to some degree by all regimes, though why that
fragment of democracy was emphasized, rather than any other, remains a
mystery.
Chinese Communism has not been well understood in this country. I
know influential people today who are both very conservative and very
anti-Soviet, who do not think Chinese Communism is really Communism at
all, and who seemed to expect that democracy would be- introduced to the
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mainland by virtue of the covering of a single wall with big-character posters.
Nixon, Kissinger and others knew better. It is impossible, however, to refrain
from noting that if, in the last two decades, any top policy-maker in
Washington has understood East Asia, and has been prepared to deal with
Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Vietnamese and others with the requisite
sensitivity (regardless of the substance of the policy concerned), such person's
existence has remained well concealed. The quite unnecessary shocks
administered by two presidents to our friends in Japan and Taiwan,
respectively, are only the most obvious examples.
With this as background, I would like to make my last and most
important point. Americans in a position to shape the country's official and
unofficial actions have had an unilinear view of human development even
though the world's actual history has been multilinear. In relation to the area
we have discussed, the profound institutional differences - leaving aside for
the moment the cultural differences - between the West and the continental
Orient have been largely ignored. In Japan (not on the continent), U.S.
occupation was apparently successful in accomplishing miracles. The major
reason for such success lay, to a large extent, in Japan's feudal or semi-feudal
history, which provided the necessary prerequisites for Japanese capitalism
and democracy today. It was not because General MacArthur was a
near-perfect Shogun (though he indeed was). In contrast, the lack of
developed institutions of private property, law and structured or hereditary
personal relationships in continental East, South and West Asia and Africa
presents formidable obstacles to the immediate reproduction of Western.
societal patterns. Thus, the problem can be traced to thousands of years of
history and not to some recent mistake of a U.S. or Asian/African
policy-maker. Such tradition might be uprooted eventually by determined
social engineering - though, as of yet, I know of no one who is capable of
conducting it - or, perhaps, by a process of gradual evolution; it will not be
corrected by a few sermons from the White House. In the Orient, instant
democracy is impossible. Instant Communism is possible, however, because it
adapts the traditional institutions of despotism to new, updated political and
economic slogans and technological innovations. What the foregoing proposi-
tion may mean for the future of the United States is a question which cannot
be explored here, though the obvious conclusions to be drawn are scarcely
those which justify much optimism.
The United States must have relations of some kind with both the USSR
and the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). Some might think that 17
million people, an economic growth rate upward of ten percent, and a degree
of freedom might also entitle Taiwan, not to mention Hong Kong, Macao and
Singapore, to some attention. In these areas the Chinese are living far better
lives than in the P.R.C. But with the two great mainland powers, some kind
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of diplomatic, commercial and even cultural contacts may be possible and
desirable. They are best undertaken without illusions and with the maximum
possible understanding of the past limits and the alternatives of the future,
avoiding the raising of impossible hopes whose certainty of being dashed will
produce only despair. America enjoys much admiration, envy and even trust
(despite all we have recently done to dissipate that) abroad. We have
stumbled before, but each time we have risen to our feet, a capacity we all
hope will be preserved and carried into the next century, at least.

